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Abstract: While island biogeography and modern economics portray Pacific island nations 16 
as isolated, ecologically fragile, resource poor and barely viable economies forever 17 
dependent on foreign aid, Pacific island history and culture conceives of their islands as 18 
intimately inter-linked to the surrounding ocean and of that ocean as an avenue to 19 
expanded resource bases, both terrestrial and aquatic. Pacific Islanders live in the most 20 
aquatic human zone on Earth, with the highest territorial ratios of sea to land. Recent 21 
studies are revealing the continuity and success of traditional near-shore guardianship of 22 
maritime resources in a number of Pacific islands. Sustainable development of seabed 23 
minerals and pelagic fisheries may offer enhanced income potential for small island 24 
nations with limited terrestrial resources. As offshore ecosystems are poorly policed, 25 
sustainable development is best realized through comprehensive planning centred on 26 
partnerships between local communities, their governments, marine scientists and 27 
commercial enterprises. The success or failure of Pacific Islanders in reasserting their 28 
maritime guardianship is now a matter of global significance given the decimation of most 29 
fisheries beyond the Pacific and the vast, but uncertain, medicinal, mineral and food 30 
resource potential of this huge area of the planet. 31 
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1. Introduction  36 
Satellite images of the Earth centered on the Pacific Ocean reveal a predominantly blue, aquatic 37 
planet. Most of this Pacific-centered hemisphere is taken up by the Pacific Ocean, with the continental 38 
boundaries of Asia, the Americas and Antarctica relegated to the margins. Unpopulated or under-populated, 39 
with small island human communities only, the Pacific Ocean, and its high seas, in particular, have 40 
become regarded as a common resource for all, controlled only by voluntary adherence to general 41 
international principles of conduct, because they lie beyond the monitoring capacity of almost all 42 
nation states and international bodies. The term high seas refer specifically to seas beyond the 43 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of nation states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 44 
the Sea (UNCLOS). The last decade has revealed mounting scientific evidence that this regime is not 45 
working, as once prolific fisheries decline substantially and much of the northern Pacific is covered in 46 
two huge gyres of floating, non-biodegradable garbage. The global problem of climate change also 47 
affects the Pacific dramatically, especially with rising sea levels threatening the viability of many atoll 48 
nations and causing severe biological stress on coral reef ecosystems.  49 
This ocean degradation poses particular problems for many of the archipelagic nations of the 50 
Pacific, which are overwhelmingly coralline and aquatic and derive much of their national income 51 
from larger, wealthier Pacific Rim nations‘ payments of access fees to exploit their fisheries and, soon, 52 
perhaps their seabed minerals. The term Pacific Rim nations collectively refers to nations straddling 53 
the Asian and American continental borders of the Pacific Ocean (China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, 54 
North Korea, Russia, USA, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, 55 
Colombia Ecuador, Peru and Chile), as well as the Island Southeast Asian nations of Indonesia and the 56 
Philippines and, finally, Australia. Pacific island nations are reasserting their ancient guardianship of 57 
the sea within this new worrying scenario in which they have been marginalized for too long.  58 
While island biogeography and modern economics portray such island nations as isolated, ecologically 59 
fragile, resource poor and barely viable economies forever dependent on foreign aid, Pacific island 60 
history and culture conceives of their islands as intimately inter-linked to the surrounding ocean and  61 
of that ocean as an avenue to expanded resource bases, both terrestrial and aquatic. Pacific Islanders 62 
live in the most aquatic human zone on Earth with the highest territorial ratios of sea to land.  63 
Recent studies are revealing the continuity and success of traditional guardianship of maritime 64 
resources in a number of Pacific islands. The success or failure of Pacific Islanders in reasserting their 65 
maritime guardianship is now a matter of global significance given the decimation of most fisheries 66 
beyond the Pacific and the undetermined medicinal, mineral and food resource potential of this huge 67 
surface of the planet and the vast volume of water beneath it. 68 
2. Economic Viability and Sustainable Development in Oceania 69 
Pacific island nations receive significant aid from their former colonial rulers, but this aid is 70 
increasingly coming with conditions attached and the ever-present threat of imminent reduction.  71 
With high birth rates, aid has already effectively diminished per head of population. Pacific territories 72 
that are still part of the territory of former colonial powers generally benefit from significant 73 
metropolitan funding, so that their income is often greater than that of their independent neighbours 74 
per head of population [1]. The result has been that the current generation of Pacific Islanders has 75 
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witnessed an unprecedented harvesting of terrestrial minerals, forest resources and offshore fisheries. 76 
Many of the archipelagic nations of Oceania are overwhelmingly coralline and aquatic and derive 77 
much of their national income from resource rents paid by fleets from Pacific Rim nations to fish this 78 
huge ocean surface of the planet and the vast volume of water beneath it. European nations have also 79 
signalled increasing interest in access to Pacific fisheries, although negotiations are currently 80 
deadlocked [2]. France plays an important role in Pacific marine research and conservation within and 81 
beyond its Pacific overseas‘ territories. Seabed mining offers a potential supplementary income source 82 
or, perhaps, a viable alternative to dependence on aid monies and stressed or exhausted land-based 83 
minerals, timber and near-shore and off-shore fisheries. The potential benefits are significant, while the 84 
potential consequences are uncertain. 85 
Fears of economic viability as micro-economies in a global world and political coherence as 86 
arbitrary colonial boundaries united diverse peoples delayed independence until the mid- to late  87 
1970s for most Pacific nations. Independent Pacific island states vary considerably in size from ten 88 
thousand in Tuvalu to approximately six million, one-hundred thousand in Papua New Guinea (PNG). 89 
A variety of languages are spoken within each nation state, and the kin-based identity is the dominant 90 
affiliation of most citizens. Most inherited limited infrastructure from their colonial rulers, since 91 
independence has been unable to provide the transport, educational, health and economic facilities 92 
needed to make their citizens willing and able to operate as citizens of a modern state. Most people 93 
still practice essentially highly localized subsistence lifestyles occasionally supplemented by cash 94 
crops. Despite poor communications and, at times, tense relations between social groups, a sizable 95 
minority of the population now travel beyond their kin group area to work in the modern economy, 96 
especially in national capitals or large multinational undertakings, such as mine sites. Such gathering 97 
places are sources of both identity formation and tension. While a new class-based urban identity  98 
has begun to take place in cities, such as Suva, many, if not most, migrants to cities rely upon 99 
wantoks—networks who speak the same language and share cultural origins [3]. 100 
The dominant development paradigm since independence has been the so-called MIRAB economy, 101 
used to describe many of the smaller nations of contemporary Oceania. The term MIRAB refers to the 102 
main funding sources of these economies; migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy. The MIRAB 103 
image is one of tiny, non-viable economies forever condemned to dependency on aid from former 104 
colonial powers, as most aid is absorbed in civil service salaries, so that remittances dependent on 105 
variable access to Pacific Rim labour markets become the main income source for those outside of 106 
government [4,5]. The late Tongan scholar, Epeli Hau‘ofa, argues that these MIRAB ―basket cases‖ 107 
were the result of barriers created by colonial boundaries and policies that imposed an artificial sense 108 
of isolation and separation upon islanders. They must now de-colonise their minds, and recast their 109 
sense of identity by rediscovering the vision of their ancestors for whom the Pacific was a boundless 110 
sea of possibilities and opportunities [6]. Most MIRAB economies fall within the conventional 111 
divisions of Polynesia and Micronesia and consist of relatively small, crowded islands in regions 112 
where sea spaces dominate and form the majority of the region‘s surface. Fisheries are an important 113 
resource for many of these nations, but access to the labour markets of former colonial rulers on the 114 
Pacific Rim are also important and possible because of the relatively small size of these national 115 
populations compared to the largest Pacific nations in Melanesia in the southwest Pacific. The term 116 
Melanesia (dark islands) was originally coined by early explorers in reference to a Pacific island sub-region 117 
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populated by what was perceived to be a separate race of culturally distinct, dark-skinned Pacific 118 
Islanders as opposed to lighter skinned inhabitants in the other two Pacific island sub-regions of 119 
Micronesia (small islands) and Polynesia (many islands). These cultural and ethnic classifications have 120 
largely been discredited today, although Melanesia remains a useful classification for distinguishing its 121 
constituent political entities of PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia as larger 122 
islands of the southwest Pacific islands with greater terrestrial resources and larger populations than 123 
the smaller, less well-resourced islands of Micronesia to the north and Polynesia to the east [7]. 124 
The resource rich and larger Pacific nations of Melanesia, especially PNG and the Solomon Islands, 125 
display a different economic pattern of large-scale and foreign controlled multinational companies 126 
extracting minerals, timber and fish and exporting them largely unprocessed, so that host nations 127 
develop comparatively few ancillary and value-added industries and receive only a fraction of the 128 
potential value of their raw materials. Melanesian nations‘ large populations have deterred Pacific Rim 129 
nations from legislating for enduring access to their labour markets, adding further pressure to develop 130 
domestic primary industries based on the extraction of raw materials. Limited resources for 131 
environmental policing of resource extraction sites, the political marginalization of land owners in the 132 
immediate vicinity of these operations, because of their small numbers and, therefore, limited 133 
parliamentary representation, and the large percentage of national income gathered by governments 134 
from multinationals have given rise to the resource curse paradigm, where resources are considered at 135 
best a double-edged sword. They attract outsiders with no commitment to local sustainability and 136 
divide local communities, pitting these same communities against what is often perceived of as an 137 
unholy alliance between big business and national governments [8–14]. Resource rich areas are often 138 
lightly populated, leading to the tragedy of the commons scenarios in which resources owned by no 139 
one are protected and sustained by no one, especially away from national capitals, where they are 140 
designated terra nugax (land belonging to no one) by authorities and become a sort of unclaimed 141 
frontier ripe for harvesting, because of the limited voting power of locals [15]. 142 
3. International Legal Rights and Economic Realities in Pacific Island Maritime Economies 143 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) forms the basis of 144 
ocean governance in Oceania. The Convention substantially extended coastal nations‘ sovereignty over 145 
adjacent waters [16–18] This benefited most modern Pacific nations as island archipelagos surrounded 146 
by vast expanses of ocean. The outer limit of territorial seas was set at 12 nautical miles (22 km), but 147 
coastal states‘ sovereignty over the living and non-living marine resources was extended to 200 148 
nautical miles (370.4 km) from shore in the form of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Coastal states 149 
were also given the right to designate what constituted a sustainable catch within their EEZ, as well as 150 
who would get access to harvesting stock in excess of this sustainable catch and the fee they would pay 151 
to the coastal state in return for this access [16] (Articles 55–75, especially 55–59). Coastal states were 152 
also given rights over the seabed and its subsoil on continental shelves. These are relatively shallow 153 
seas that extend out unbroken from the coast. Because of variable geological criteria, they were given fixed 154 
legal definitions relating to distance from shore and depth: extending to 350 nautical miles (648 km) from 155 
defined coastlines or 100 nautical miles (185.2 km) beyond the 2,600 meter isobeth [16] (Articles 76–85). 156 
(An isobeth is a conceptual line joining points of the same depth.) 157 
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UNCLOS III also provided a detailed conflict resolution structure to resolve competing claims, 158 
such as where EEZs and continental shelves overlapped, for example. Beyond these sovereign areas, 159 
the principle of freedom of the high seas prevailed, with access open to all. However, even here, 160 
regulation designed to avoid conflict has occurred. For example, the International Seabed Authority 161 
has recognized and registered claims made on much of the eastern Pacific seabed by various applicant 162 
nations or national commercial entities, because of the potential wealth of seabed minerals there, 163 
despite most of this region lying in international waters beyond any EEZ [19]. As discussed below, 164 
however, these resources have recently been found to be extremely valuable, to the point where they 165 
are commercially viable to mine with currently available technology, yet they lie in maritime regions 166 
still only governed by voluntary adherence to vague principles, rather than set laws and effective 167 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  168 
The last legal concept used in UNCLOS III for extending coastal sovereignty was that of 169 
archipelagic rights. Nations with islands considered so closely linked politically, geographically and 170 
historically as to form an intrinsically inter-linked entity were given the right to draw their EEZ 171 
baseline around the outer edge of their outer islands. All waters within this baseline are deemed to be 172 
territorial waters, as long as the ratio of water to land is not greater than nine to one [16] (Articles 46–54, 173 
especially 47–50), [20]. 174 
UNCLOS III did not officially come into force until 1994, when the required number of nations had 175 
ratified it. By then, Pacific island nations had introduced national legislation to apply its measures 176 
within their national boundaries, and the provisions were operating de facto in international fishing 177 
agreements relating to the Pacific. The new 200 miles (370.4 km) EEZs dramatically increased the 178 
territory of Pacific island nations, particularly archipelagic ones. For example, Fiji‘s 18,272 square 179 
kilometre of land provided an EEZ of 1,290,000 square kilometre, Kiribati‘s 690 square kilometre of 180 
islands translated into an EEZ of 3,550,000 square kilometre, while the Federated States of 181 
Micronesia‘s (FSM) 701 square kilometre of land equated to an EEZ of 2,978,000 square kilometre. 182 
Kiribati derives 45% of its revenue from fishing and fishing license fees, while the Federated States of 183 
Micronesia derive around a quarter of its revenue from these sources. The largest EEZ in Oceania is that of 184 
French Polynesia, whose 4,167 square kilometre of land resulted in an EEZ of 4,767,242 square  185 
kilometre [3] (p. 369), [20–23]. 186 
The potential maritime benefits of political independence have been eroded by economic realities. 187 
As small or fragmented political and cultural entities that inherited limited modern infrastructure from 188 
their former colonial rulers, Pacific island nations had limited ability to generate income domestically; 189 
this meant that much income was absorbed in providing basic facilities and services taken for  190 
granted in more developed nations. Offshore fishing fleets from larger and wealthier Pacific Rim 191 
nations regularly violated Pacific island EEZs in the absence of local monitoring. The same lack of 192 
resources to monitor offshore waters also meant that Island nations could not develop effective fishing 193 
fleets and were forced into fishing access agreements that returned a mere fraction of the value of  194 
the catch at market. The alternatives were forgoing this income and watching the offshore fishery erode 195 
through unmonitored fishing by non-citizens or continued over-reliance on foreign aid from former 196 
colonizers [3] (pp. 368, 377–378), [24] (p. 83), [25–28].  197 
Conditions improved as island nations agreed to speak as one through the Forum Fisheries Agency, 198 
which developed considerable scientific and legal expertise on Pacific fisheries management.  199 
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Whereas Japan‘s use of aid to remove restrictive fishing regulations worked well in the early 1980s 200 
through essentially lop-sided bilateral agreements with Pacific island nations, the balance of power 201 
changed in the late 1980s. Japan faces an increasingly united independent Oceania from this time and 202 
significant competition from other players willing to sign more balanced fishing deals. Circumstances 203 
particularly changed in favour of island nations after the US signed a multilateral access agreement 204 
with Pacific nations [24] (p. 96). 205 
The sea out of sight of land within and beyond Pacific island nations‘ EEZs remains beyond the 206 
control of the state. These areas beyond the shoreline horizon are the aquatic equivalent to Burton‘s 207 
terra nugax—resource rich areas on land that are often lightly populated or harvested by relatively few 208 
people, so that local inhabitants have little political influence in national parliaments and other 209 
decision-making bodies, which are invariably based in national capitals. The seas of the Pacific are the 210 
aquatic equivalent—mare nugax, especially as their increasingly valued resources attract more and 211 
more commercial attention. Such circumstances can be seen as existing in high seas beyond EEZs and, 212 
indeed, over most parts of EEZs beyond site of land, given the scarce monitoring resources of Pacific 213 
island nations. 214 
The consequences of these circumstances and potential solutions sought by Pacific island nations 215 
are discussed below in relation to the two most valuable offshore assets discovered so far in  216 
Oceania—tuna and seabed minerals. Such a comparison is rare, but vital, as the long data sets now 217 
accumulated on the increasingly under stress tuna fishery raise serious issues about the efficacy of the 218 
broadly similar multilateral de jure or de facto voluntary compliance regimes (in the absence of 219 
monitoring capacity) being set up to manage mining of the seabed. 220 
4. Preservation of the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery 221 
The open ocean fisheries of Oceania are classic examples of the economic paradigm of the tragedy 222 
of the commons—the idea that there is a tendency towards unsustainable use of areas not owned by 223 
specific groups or individuals, but for which there is common access, either legally or de facto [29].  224 
In such circumstances, no one group has a compelling interest to protect them if they are open to all 225 
comers, and so, they seek to maximize their return before the resource is exhausted. Such 226 
circumstances can be seen as existing in high seas beyond EEZs and, indeed, over most parts of EEZs 227 
beyond site of land, given the scarce monitoring resources of Pacific island nations. The Western and 228 
Central Pacific tuna fishery is particularly under stress from over-fishing, because of these circumstances, 229 
with the only current means of reversing this trend being voluntary conservation regimes seeking to 230 
persuade fishers that it is in their best long-term interests to comply. 231 
The Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery is the largest and most intact tuna fishery in the world, 232 
supplying around half of the world‘s tuna supplies. It is also crucial to the nations it straddles, as their 233 
territorial sea to land ratio is up to 3,000 to one, and their land resources are scarce, as well as 234 
circumscribed. These nations lack the capital to develop their own domestic fleets and to maintain and 235 
run patrol vessels and, so, generally opt for renting out fishing rights within their EEZs to fleets from 236 
larger, wealthier Pacific Rim nations for, on average, only 3%–4% of the value of the catch landed. 237 
For example, in 1998, Pacific island nations received approximately 60 million USD in fishing access 238 
fees from fleets that declare an annual catch sale price of approximately 1.3–1.9 billion USD.  239 
Data from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community reveals that Oceanic nations‘ EEZs yield 78 240 
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percent of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna catch. The Oceanic artisanal catch represents 241 
less than 10 percent of the total catch in this fishery [12,30–34]. 242 
The wealth of the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery relative to over-exploited and exhausted 243 
fisheries elsewhere has resulted in increased pressure on this fishery. The main species targeted in the 244 
Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery are skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), yellowfin tuna 245 
(Thunnus albacares) and bigeye tuna (T. obesus) [30]. In the last decade, the Secretariat of the Pacific 246 
Community has declared bluefin tuna critically endangered and bigeye and yellowfin tuna to be in 247 
dramatic decline [35]. The reason is not hard to determine. The total harvest has increased by an 248 
average of 5% per year over the past 50 years. This average understates the escalating pressure the 249 
fishery is under given that the number of boat-days has risen about 10% per year over the period, 250 
1970–2000 [36]. In addition to this, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing within this 251 
fishery is estimated to take between eight and 16 percent of the reported annual catch in the  252 
Asia-Pacific region [37,38]. The IUU fishing in Oceania takes the form of unlicensed vessels fishing 253 
within EEZs, fishing in closed areas or misreporting or under-reporting of catches [39]. The IUU 254 
fishing vessels have lower costs than licensed vessels, as they pay less or no fees and are not bound by 255 
national or regional fisheries requirements. 256 
A variety of management principles and agreements have been applied to improve the health of the 257 
fishery and gain greater control and benefits for Pacific island nations. Pacific island nations have 258 
pooled their fisheries expertise for economies of scale to provide member nations with advice and 259 
information they could not have access to with their individual resources. These island nations have a 260 
regional scientific fisheries data collecting agency in Noumea, New Caledonia, within the Secretariat 261 
of the Pacific Community, and a managerial and advisory agency body, the Forum Fisheries Agency 262 
(FFA), in Honiara in the Solomon Islands. These pooled resources have their limits, though, in dealing 263 
with distant water fishing nations (DWFN) [40]. 264 
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 2001 sought to develop a regime for voluntary action 265 
by stakeholder nations to preserve global fisheries. The agreement was based around the principle that 266 
coastal nations containing harvestable fisheries and DWFN required cooperation to effectively manage 267 
fish stocks on a sustainable basis, either bilaterally or multilaterally, or through setting up Regional 268 
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). The 2004 Tuna Convention flowed on from this, but 269 
its poorly funded Fisheries Commission limited its regulatory capacity, with enforcement of guidelines 270 
for sustainable harvests left to flag states—that is, states the fishing vessels are registered in, but not 271 
necessarily resident in. This created an obvious distance from, and tension with, territorial states in 272 
which unsustainable harvests are made and was also impractical if the catch was sold in a port of a 273 
third state, especially one not party to a regional agreement. The Western and Central Pacific tuna 274 
fishery is collectively managed by member countries of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 275 
Commission (WCPFC). Members agree to adhere to a set of multilateral compliance measures, 276 
including compulsory registration of all fishing vessels, a vessel tracking system that plots the location 277 
of all registered fishing vessels and a scheme to record and cap the total number of vessel days in the 278 
fishery by purse seine vessels. None of these measures address the problem of IUU fishing,  279 
however [36,37]. 280 
Ten DWFN harvest 86 percent of the catch sold at market from the Pacific, especially Japan, Taiwan, 281 
South Korea and the United States. Despite that all major stakeholders bar Japan from signing a 282 
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Multilateral High Level Convention (MHLC) on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 283 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean in Honolulu in 2000 [41], DWFN continue to 284 
prefer bilateral relations to multilateral ones when dealing with Pacific island nations [31,41,42].  285 
The exception has been the United States, whose multilateral agreement with Pacific Forum nations 286 
produced terms more favourable to island nations than most bilateral ones with DWFN [43]. Bilateral 287 
agreements tend to be less restrictive on DWFN operations than protocols Pacific island nations 288 
collectively agreed to in the FFA. The latter are perceived as also potentially compromising bilateral aid, 289 
which is seen by DWFN donors as a potential tool for access to fishery rights on terms desired by them. 290 
Many of the DWFN that signed MHLC 2000 have plans to develop canneries in the Pacific Marine 291 
Industrial Zone (PMIZ) in Madang, PNG. This a huge enterprise, which will eventually consist of 10 292 
canneries processing the catch of many fleets fishing the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery on a 293 
scale well in excess of FFA scientific models for sustainable catches for this fishery. PNG has its own 294 
fishing fleet and is a member of the FFA, but sees its best interests as lying in these collective bilateral 295 
arrangements. However, the PNG Government is out of kilter with the desires of its coastal dwelling 296 
citizens, who have consistently rejected large-scale foreign-owned developments on the coast as 297 
perilous to the local environment and economy. The traditional owners of the land the PMIZ is due to 298 
be built on oppose the scheme, but have been removed from their land without compensation by 299 
national laws that privilege government over local communities when national development schemes 300 
are agreed upon. Traditional maritime tenure and exploitation rights are even more tenuous under 301 
national legislation [44,45]. 302 
Economists Chand, Grafton and Peterson argue that only multilateral agreements can provide the 303 
basic requirements for sustainable governance of the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery [12]. 304 
These requirements are that: fishers were actively involved in co-management of resources; that total 305 
exploitation rates need to be accepted by most resource users and set at sustainable levels; fishers need 306 
both long-term interests in preserving the fishery and individual incentives to do so; and lastly, that as 307 
with all international agreements, all parties must voluntarily cooperate in joint management, abide by 308 
the rules of exploitation and support mechanisms to restrict new entrants into the fishery. They see the 309 
need for a single policy maker, such as a tuna commission, to set consistent and universally applied 310 
rules, to arbitrate disputes and support measures to restrict new entrants. Such an authority  311 
requires stakeholders to agree to give a percentage of their catch revenue to the authority to provide it 312 
with financial powers and capacity. In another paper on this fishery, Parris and Grafton note a tension 313 
between coastal nation national jurisdiction in EEZs and multilateral jurisdiction beyond EEZs in 314 
which coastal nations perceive little benefit to themselves from exploiting the high seas [46].  315 
They suggest that such tension can be reduced by sharing any rise in sale price with Pacific nations as 316 
the USA agreed to, setting up Trust Funds for them from tuna sales to partly rectify the small 3%–4% 317 
of catch sale price they receive as a resource rent [12,33,46]. 318 
There are a variety of other options. Fleets of the European Union (EU) pay an average access rent 319 
equating to 18% of the catch sale price to West African coastal nations (and up to 45% of the catch 320 
sale price in some cases), which if applied to the 1998 figures for Oceania cited above would mean a 321 
leap from 60 million USD in access fees to 270 million USD. As the world‘s fisheries diminish, the 322 
bargaining position of Pacific island nations should increase to enable the negotiation of similar rates 323 
to those occurring in the more exhausted Atlantic fishery. Setting aside a percentage of this increased 324 
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revenue for monitoring and policing could raise income and protect the fishery by countering the huge 325 
trade in unreported and illegal fishing that floats unknown on top of the official sale price and catch 326 
figures. Kompas et al. argue that if the amount of tuna landed were to be reduced and if stocks were to 327 
rise due to reduced fishing, then profits (but not necessarily total revenues) would increase, because 328 
tuna would be easier and cheaper to catch [36]. Carrying on with the same levels of exploitation will 329 
soon lead to massive financial losses as the cost of locating and landing increasingly scarce tuna 330 
outweigh increased sale price, due to scarcity. In other words, at lower rates of exploitation, Pacific 331 
island nations and DWFN would, overall, make more money [36,37,47]. 332 
5. Sovereignty and Access Issues Surrounding Seabed Mining 333 
The oceans‘ benthic (seabed) environments remain some of the least known ecosystems on Earth, 334 
despite the fact that most of the Earth‘s geological surface is seabed. In July 2011, slowly 335 
accumulating evidence of the economic potential of the ocean floor was given a boost when Japanese 336 
scientists published evidence of large deposits of rare-earth metals on the seabed in the eastern South 337 
Pacific and central North Pacific [48]. Rare-earth metals are among the most expensive minerals on 338 
Earth, because of the general lack of terrestrial sources concentrated enough to be commercially viable 339 
to mine. There have been significant advances in seabed technology in recent years for exploring and 340 
mining at great depths [49]. Other types of mineral deposits are also claimed to be approaching viable 341 
levels for seabed mining, although these claims are by no means uncontested, as discussed below. 342 
A recently discovered rare-earths‘ deposit between 3 and 5–6 km deep off Japan is reportedly 343 
1,000-times larger than any on land [49]. Rare-earths is the collective name for 17 oxidized minerals 344 
vital to modern computer and green technology, such as wind turbines and fuel efficient cars. The 345 
battery of a Toyota Primus, for example, has more than 20 pounds of the rare-earth element, 346 
Lanthanum (element 57 on the element table), while magnets on large wind turbines may contain  347 
500 pounds of neodymium (element 60). Rare-earths are not so much rare and rarely concentrated in 348 
sufficient amounts to be commercially exploitable. The timing of the offshore discovery was fortuitous 349 
for Japan, as in 2010, China, which supplies 97% of the world‘s rare-earth needs, cut shipments to 350 
Japan for a month over a heated dispute between the two nations over ownership of the 351 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese burgeoning economy already absorbs up 60% of the Chinese  352 
rare-earth production, prompting fears that it may soon reduce exports to build up its own reserves.  353 
As world demand approached supply, the Chinese measures against Japan in 2010 prompted a surge in 354 
the price of rare-earths, with the price of Cerium (Element 58), for example, increasing 450% in 2010 355 
alone. The Pacific seabed discoveries of rare-earths published in the journal Nature Geoscience in July, 356 
2011, were found to be so rich, that according to one of the investigating team members, Yasuhiro Kato, an 357 
Associate Professor of Earth Science at the University of Tokyo, ―The deposits have a heavy 358 
concentration of rare-earths. Just one square kilometre (0.4 square mile) of deposits will be able to 359 
provide one-fifth of the current global annual consumption [48,50–52]‖. 360 
This new maritime frontier looks set to expand in the near future. The Canadian mining company, 361 
Nautilus Minerals, has announced advanced preparations to commence large-scale deep sea mining 362 
operations for copper and gold in PNG in 2013, and the United Nations‘ designated regulator of 363 
seabed mining beyond EEZs, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), is processing a small,  364 
but rising number of applications for seabed mineral exploration in the Pacific. While Nautilus‘s 365 
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operations in PNG have been delayed, the delay centres on a legal dispute with the host government 366 
over cost sharing arrangements rather than issues of technical or economic viability [53] (p. 6). The 367 
rapidity of progress towards commercial seabed mining commencing has left national governments 368 
and international regulators scrambling to design and put in place policies, safeguards and laws 369 
pertaining to seabed minerals within and beyond EEZs [48–51]. These new economic opportunities 370 
may also pose a potential threat of unknown magnitude to Pacific fisheries and may require greater 371 
coordination between fisheries and seabed mining regulators and industries in years to come. 372 
There are three types of known seabed mineral deposits. The main Pacific locations of each 373 
type of deposit are illustrated in Figure 1 below. The first consists of manganese nodule, which are 374 
fist-sized polymetallic clumps containing valuable minerals, such as manganese, nickel, copper and 375 
cobalt, that lie on the seabed. Most known deposits lie in the deep ocean in international waters as deep 376 
as 5,000 meters or three miles down. Most known deposits are in the central Pacific and, also, to a 377 
lesser extent, in the Indian Ocean. The concentrations with the most commercial potential in the 378 
Pacific are located at depths of 4,500 to 5,500 meters in the Clarion Clipperton area of the central 379 
eastern Pacific. Manganese nodules are considered to be commercially viable if they have an average 380 
nickel and copper content of 2.25% or more and a nodule density of around 10 kilograms per square 381 
metre. Analysis of nodules in the Clarion Clipperton area suggests that this area alone contains twice 382 
the amount of cobalt contained in total land-based reserves [54–57]. Although their existence has been 383 
known for over 100 years, technical difficulties with extraction, legal uncertainty about access and 384 
ownership rights to seabed mine sites and the cost of extraction relative to land-based deposits deterred 385 
seabed mining. Sustainability may also be an issue once more data on their abundance is known, as 386 
nodules take millennia to reach their modest size. Improvements in technology derived from offshore 387 
oil and gas operations have now made the extraction of this type of mineral technically feasible. The 388 
second type of potentially commercially viable seabed mineral deposit is cobalt-rich crusts on ridges 389 
and seamounts in all the world oceans [58]. 390 
Figure 1. Pacific seabed mineral locations.  391 
 392 
The third type of seabed mineral deposit is polymetallic sulphides formed around hot springs in 393 
volcanic areas where seawater heated by hot rock as it seeps into volcanic fissures dissolves minerals 394 
and, then, rises like a geyser from the seabed to cool and condense the minerals. These deposits can be 395 
up to seven-times the quality of the same mineral mined on land and can grow up to six meters per 396 
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year. These vents abound along the Western Pacific‘s Rim of Fire. Most of those discovered so far lie 397 
within EEZ with many in water as shallow as 1–2 km, and they have already attracted bids for 398 
exploration licenses off New Zealand, Japan, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands and PNG. To date, around 399 
200 vent fields have been located, although most appear too small to be viable to mine [59,60].  400 
The Pacific‘s first significant seabed mining operation being developed by Nautilus Minerals in PNG 401 
targets one of these types of deposits. 402 
Exploration has revealed a consistent pattern of vent fields occurring at 100 kilometre intervals, 403 
which would equate to 600 fields emitting minerals of varying amounts along the Pacific‘s mid-ocean 404 
ridge alone. Nautilus Minerals estimates that if just 50 percent of these fields prove to be commercially 405 
viable, this would represent several billion tonnes of copper per annum [54]. Its first seabed mine 406 
volcanic vent site in PNG, the 0.112 square kilometre Solwara 1, is considered commercially viable, as 407 
its copper deposits are ten times more concentrated than most copper deposits mined on land. Prior to 408 
its legal dispute with the PNG Government, Joe Dowling, Vice President of Investor Relations for 409 
Nautilus Minerals, expected Solwara I to be in production by the end of 2013 and to generate  410 
ca. 80,000 tonnes of copper and 150,000 ounces of gold per year. Nautilus‘s exploratory investigations 411 
at Solwara and other sites in the Bismarck Sea have led them to estimate that the site could yield  412 
1.5 million tonnes of ore with copper and gold content per year. If Nautilus reports on the Solwara site, 413 
which is 50 km north of New Britain and 30 km west of New Ireland at 1,600 meters depth, are 414 
representative, then this load will yield 7% copper and six grams of gold per tonne of ore extracted—well 415 
beyond the minimum concentration designated as profitable in these circumstances and much higher 416 
than the 0.5% some terrestrial mines operate at. While Nautilus has committed up to 80 million USD 417 
from 2005 until January, 2011, on exploration projects for its PNG venture and has been in negotiation 418 
with the PNG Government for over a decade on its proposed seabed mining operations, the accuracy 419 
of its estimates will only be revealed when Solwara commences operations [49,54,61–64]. 420 
A number of seabed mining specialists within the scientific community remain cautious about 421 
claims over seabed mining‘s economic and environmental feasibility. The economic viability argument 422 
for seabed mining is based on the assumption that the Earth‘s terrestrial mineral deposits are 423 
diminishing and that desired minerals will therefore increase in price as they become rare to the extent 424 
that the elevated price will compensate for the added costs of seabed mining compared to land-based 425 
mining. However, it has been noted that many land-based mines operate below full extraction capacity and 426 
large finds of valued minerals have been made on land in recent decades, such as the huge Grasberg 427 
deposit in 1988 in the vicinity of the long exploited Ertsberg mine in Indonesian New Guinea and 428 
Canada‘s largest ever large copper, cobalt and nickel deposit at Voisey‘s Bay in Newfoundland in 1994. 429 
Demand also generates recycling, conservation and technical advances to make extraction of lower 430 
grade sources viable. The extremely high and rising prices of rare-earths are unusual. For much of the 431 
1980s and 1990s, world mineral prices were generally low. Those cautious about the economic 432 
benefits of seabed mining also note that mineral prices should lower as more minerals are extracted 433 
from the seabed, thereby eroding the very pricing mechanism that would make seabed mining 434 
economically viable. Claims about the technical viability of seabed mining are also untested in  435 
full-scale commercial operations. Critics concede that volcanic vent deposits in relatively shallow 436 
waters within EEZs are the best option for testing the technical viability of commercial seabed mining, 437 
but note that the extraction of manganese nodules and seacrust deposits in deeper waters has not been 438 
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really investigated to the degree needed for commercial operators to commit significant funds to 439 
commence serious preparatory operations. In such circumstances, seabed mining and exploration 440 
would only be viable with government subsidies based on strategic reasons rather than economic 441 
reasons. It is argued that many of the seabed mining ventures in the Pacific in the past and today are 442 
driven by strategic, rather than economic considerations. The Chinese previously mentioned withholding 443 
of rare-earth shipments to Japan during its dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands reinforces the 444 
importance of such considerations [64–68]. 445 
Commercial commitment to projects is best reflected in the amount spent on them. Nautilus‘s 446 
announced expenditure of around 80 million to exploration in the Solwara project until January, 2011, 447 
averages just over 13 million per year for no return to date [53]. In its 2007 Annual Report, the company 448 
announced cash reserves of 310 million USD and annual exploration costs of 40,876,742 USD (or 7.75% 449 
of cash reserves) for the year ending 31 December, 2007, compared to 3,280,937 USD in exploration costs 450 
for the year ending December 31, 2006. The vast majority of annual expenditure was spent on its PNG 451 
operations, however [63]. To put this in perspective, studies of seabed mining operations in the 1970s 452 
and 1980s noted that mining companies only spent 5%–7% of their annual budget on seabed mining 453 
exploration and research and development, as evidence that these projects were more speculative than 454 
prioritized [64]. In other words, Nautilus is financially more committed to its seabed mining 455 
exploratory phase operations in the Pacific than earlier commercial operators. 456 
Indigenous peoples in Oceania who face the prospect of seabed mining are generally reluctant to 457 
have this activity in their neighbourhoods, despite the potential prospects of financial wealth and 458 
employment arising from mining operations. While tests of seabed mining have been conducted to 459 
monitor environmental damage to mined areas, the silt plume drifts arising from them suggesting that 460 
damage was temporary and acceptable, there are no working operations to prove or disprove claims 461 
from all parties [54,55]. In the absence of conclusive data, the potential for irreversible ecological 462 
damage from seabed mining is a justified fear for Pacific communities that are largely reliant on 463 
subsistence activities partly supplemented by growing crops or harvesting fauna from sea and land for 464 
sale in the cash economy. The inter-connected nature of near-shore and offshore ecosystems still 465 
requires much research, but is beyond dispute, as are the unforeseen and dramatic reverberations that 466 
even a small alteration in ecosystems can have elsewhere in the system [69]. 467 
In 2008, a coalition representing coastal communities around the Bismarck-Solomon Sea sought a 468 
greater say in decisions on seabed mining for indigenous peoples and vowed not to support any such 469 
operation until solid evidence could be provided by companies or the PNG Government that seabed 470 
mining would not cause significant damage to coastal and marine ecosystems [70]. There is 471 
insufficient data to ascertain how unified coastal communities are on this issue, and PNG‘s legislative 472 
framework favours state control of the sea and does not recognize indigenous or local community 473 
maritime tenure. Strong cases for recognition of native title have been argued elsewhere in Oceania, in 474 
nations where local indigenous community rights and guardianship to the sea were much more 475 
disrupted by colonial conquest and involuntary alienation of coastal land [71–73]. 476 
Seabed mineral deposits may have other significant economic value, as well as minerals.  477 
No hydrothermal vent communities have been comprehensively biologically mapped, and some may 478 
contain species with potentially significant energy or medical applications to human societies.  479 
For example, the biochemical properties of organisms that can tolerate temperature extremes found in 480 
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and around deep sea vents and that find sustenance in toxic fluids of the vents have great potential 481 
benefit for biotechnology industries. Enzymes from hydrothermal vent organisms are already being 482 
used in a variety of ways, such as skin lotion that counters damage from free radicals [74–77]. 483 
Hydrothermal vent biota are specialized to adapt to their unique habitats and are, therefore, highly 484 
vulnerable to disruption of these habitats, especially given that the surrounding seabed ecology is 485 
usually quite different [54]. It therefore follows that seabed mining for minerals may destroy flora and 486 
fauna that also have economic and medicinal value for humanity, most of it as yet unknown. Vents 487 
targeted for mineral extraction should ideally be thoroughly biologically mapped before the 488 
commencement of mining. Balancing the delay in securing mineral revenue from mining, while seabed 489 
communities are mapped, and the possible loss of revenue and medical cures from biological 490 
extraction present the designated regulators of the seabed within and beyond Pacific EEZs with yet 491 
another significant legal conundrum to deal with. 492 
Solwara 1, the Pacific‘s first potential commercial seabed mining operation, has been approached 493 
cautiously. The PNG National Government has the legal right to sanction seabed mining and has given 494 
its approval for mining to commence with due respect to PNG‘s strict environmental protection 495 
standards, which reflect almost four decades of dealing with and learning from land-based mining 496 
operations and ecological disasters, such as the downstream toxic pollution from the Ok Tedi copper 497 
and goldmine. At a Deep Sea Mineral Project Workshop in June, 2011, Senior Technical Assistant 498 
Engineer with PNG‘s Minerals Resource Authority (MRA), Lyndah Brown-Kola, noted that PNG‘s 499 
lease agreement with Nautilus reflected the lessons of 36 years of developing legislation and 500 
regulatory frameworks for mining. She noted that this legislative and regulatory framework was 501 
administered by the MRA in conjunction with the Department of Mineral Policy and Geohazards 502 
Management. Government legislation also provides for PNG to acquire up to 30% equity in mining 503 
operations in their country, and government policy is to provide a portion to the landowners as 504 
royalties through the government‘s independent commercial entity, Petromin. Brown-Kola noted that 505 
the license for seabed mining operations granted to Nautilus in 2008 only occurred at the end of a  506 
14-year process of working with the company [78]. Scientific observers of the Solwara 1 site were 507 
impressed with Nautilus‘s protocols for protecting benthic biota in the exploratory stage of operations 508 
during their visit in 2006 [54]. 509 
Despite these lengthy negotiations, the untested nature of seabed mining and the limited research on 510 
seabed biological communities means that the environmental impact of seabed mining will only 511 
become apparent after mining commences. In such circumstances, the precautionary principle or 512 
precautionary approach should, and indeed must, prevail. This precautionary principle states that in the 513 
absence of scientific consensus on whether an action or policy will harm the public or the 514 
environment, the instigators must prove that it is not harmful before commencing. The precautionary 515 
approach offers more leeway for moving forward with caution than the precautionary principle, 516 
although both allow some leeway for new actions to be attempted with due consideration of safeguards 517 
as all the consequences of new actions cannot be known in advance [79,80]. These concepts have 518 
gained increasingly wider support since articulated as Principle 15 of the Rio Earth Summit 519 
Declaration in 1992. Principle 15 states ―In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 520 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 521 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 522 
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postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation‖ [81]. In the case of seabed 523 
mining in unexplored or underexplored benthic biological communities, this might take the form of 524 
intensive biological surveys before the commencement of seabed mining and, also, beginning 525 
operations with a period of less intensive mining on one, preferably discrete section of a larger 526 
ecosystem to monitor the impact of mining and have an ecological reserve in case of unanticipated 527 
devastation. The appropriate length and form of such an experimental stage of mining would involve 528 
balancing marine science and commercial imperatives. 529 
The final determinant of decisions to mine the seabed is perhaps the most problematic—security of 530 
ownership and/or user or extraction rights of the seabed, especially for deep seas beyond national 531 
EEZs. The determination of such rights is still being worked out within EEZs and, beyond national 532 
EEZs, remains confined to the granting of rights to explore for minerals in geographical zones applied 533 
for by mining companies, increasingly with the support of one or more national governments. The 534 
final UNCLOS set up the International Seabed Authority (ISA) in 1994 to regulate deep sea mining 535 
ventures outside nations‘ EEZs [82]. All 159 signatories to UNCLOS and the European Community 536 
are members of the ISA. The ISA‘s two representative bodies are the ISA Assembly on which all 537 
members sit and the 36-member Council elected by the Assembly on the basis of criteria designed to 538 
ensure equitable representation for various groups, including those engaged in seabed mineral 539 
exploration (four members); land-based producers of minerals found on the seabed (four members); 540 
developing nation states with special interests, such as those with large populations, land-locked 541 
nations, island states and states that are potential land-based producers of seabed minerals or major 542 
importers of minerals to come from the sea beds to be mined (six members); and geographical 543 
coverage of the globe, with at least one member from each of the following regions: Africa, Asia, 544 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and others. Membership is rotated 545 
by vote on a four-year cycle and is held by representatives of nation-states. At present, Fiji is the only 546 
Pacific island member of the ISA Council [82–84]. Assumptions that seabed mining beyond EEZs is 547 
only a distant possibility at present mean that the Authority currently only holds one annual session 548 
and has a modest budget of only 6.5 million USD and 35 staff members [54,82]. 549 
Legislation pertaining to Pacific island national EEZs also remains embryonic, but momentum is 550 
gathering, as more and more companies seek access and preparations for seabed mining operations to 551 
commence. The EU is currently sponsoring a four-year project to help Pacific Forum nations to 552 
develop their seabed mining policy frameworks [85,86]. In 2008, private companies in Tonga and 553 
Nauru aligned with the Canadian company, Nautilus Minerals, and supported by their governments, 554 
became the first developing nation entities to apply for ISA authorization to explore the seabed beyond 555 
EEZs for polymetallic nodules. The ISA granted an exploration contract to Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. 556 
in July, 2011, and to Tonga Offshore Mining Limited in January, 2012 [19,87].  557 
6. Conclusion: Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Marine Resource Management 558 
Pacific island nations face major challenges in seeking multilateral solutions to oceanic issues 559 
confronting them. Their collective thinking is reflected in the Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy 560 
(PIROP) produced by a Marine Sector Working Group of the Council of Regional Organisations in the 561 
Pacific in response to a request from Pacific Island Forum leaders in 1999. The PIROP seeks to 562 
―ensure the future sustainable use of our ocean and its resources by Pacific islands‘ communities and 563 
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external partners‖ [88]. The PIROP outlined five guiding principles for ensuring this objective: 564 
improving understanding of the ocean; sustainable development and management of ocean resources; 565 
maintaining the health of the ocean; promoting the peaceful use of the ocean; and creating partnerships 566 
and promoting cooperation. 567 
Within these broad global concerns, more Oceania-specific principles were emphasized, such as the 568 
importance of protecting traditional knowledge of the sea and the implied intrinsic value of such 569 
knowledge alongside and in partnership with Western marine scientific knowledge. PIROP was 570 
endorsed by Pacific island leaders and expected to serve as the foundation for the development of 571 
national ocean policies, as well as enhanced regional guardianship of the Pacific [88]. The first major 572 
follow up meeting after the PIROP was launched was the Pacific Islands Regional Oceans Forum held 573 
in Fiji in 2004, with discussion centering on how to convert the principles into implementable actions 574 
nationally and regionally. Regional support for the 2000 WCPFC and PIROP made Oceanic nations world 575 
leaders in the development of regional collaborative initiatives to protect and sustain what Laurence 576 
Cordonnery rightly labels ―the largest and last commercially sustainable ocean on Earth‖ [31] (p. 731). 577 
There is mounting evidence that a three-tier scheme combining local community near-shore 578 
management, with national and regional frameworks, combining indigenous, national, scientific and 579 
commercial interests, may be the best and, indeed, only way to preserve and regulate Oceania‘s marine 580 
resources. The wealth of most near-shore fisheries, especially the highly productive reef and lagoon 581 
complexes surrounding many islands, meant that fishing activities and tenure units were generally 582 
much more concentrated than elsewhere in the world. The incomplete nature of European conquest 583 
and consolidation in the Pacific islands meant that indigenous tenure and use of the sea continued in 584 
varying degrees alongside the rules and practices of the new colonizers. Historical and anthropological 585 
research has revealed that coastal Pacific Islanders controlled and exploited a wide variety of inshore 586 
and blue water ecosystems. Results varied. Their most enduring and successful systems of fisheries 587 
management have been highly localized operations, where communities reliant on harvesting the sea 588 
also regulate its use [33,34,71,89]. Much of Oceania‘s commercially harvested fisheries fall within the 589 
territorial waters of Pacific island nations. While concerns have already been raised about the depletion 590 
of certain species of tuna in offshore waters by unmonitored multinational fleets, islanders still retain 591 
control of near-shore waters upon which much of the offshore fishery is built. 592 
The Pacific 2020 Background Paper: Fisheries recommends improving coastal fisheries management 593 
through community involvement [90]. As well as monetary benefits, local participation in inshore 594 
harvesting provides protein sources, import substitution for costly processed foods and local 595 
management of marine areas. Kiribati is developing a variety of initiatives to expand its near-shore 596 
resource base. These include tapping into the specialist aquarium fish market and seaweed and pearl 597 
farming [22] (pp. 9–14). Grafton et al. are more specific, pointing out that such schemes are particularly 598 
effective if local communities have the incentive to effectively manage the resource through uncontested 599 
ownership and receiving benefits from the harvest of the resource [91]. Management is most effective 600 
when there are group rights that lead to collective community action [91,92]. 601 
Local community control of local near-shore fisheries, as practiced by Pacific Islanders, has also 602 
worked well as a conservation and management principle in parts of the Pacific Rim not controlled by 603 
indigenous peoples, such as Japan. Pacific island and Pacific Rim marine management systems represent 604 
a wide variety of workable schemes and contexts that are all concerned with disputed near-shore access 605 
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rights. Comparative studies of such disputes and their resolution are needed to broaden awareness of 606 
options and put local disputes into context. A series of local regimes and interest groups can and do 607 
operate under a broad umbrella of national or international principles, such as conservation of 608 
endangered ecosystems and species being paramount over sector or community interests, and open, but 609 
differentiated, access to the foreshore on the basis of historical and cultural factors [92–96]. 610 
Such a comprehensive approach is vital, as epitomized by the two case studies detailed above, in 611 
which seabed minerals and the tuna fishery in the waters above the seabed are dealt with as separate legal 612 
entities covered by different authorities under UNCLOS and migratory tuna are covered by different 613 
provisions in different locations along their routes. The new economic opportunities offered by seabed 614 
mining may also pose a potential threat of unknown magnitude to Pacific fisheries and may require 615 
greater coordination between fisheries and seabed mining regulators and industries in years to come. 616 
Cordonnery ends his insightful commentary on the practicality of implementing the PIROP by 617 
noting its two major challenges—one within Oceania and one concerning DWFN. ―Within the region, 618 
political leadership and the willingness to commit and raise adequate resources will be essential if the 619 
foreseeable implementation difficulties outlined in this article are to be overcome. This challenge will 620 
determine whether the Policy can be used as a model in ocean governance as it promises to be.  621 
For regional powers within the Pacific Rim who were not part of the inception and endorsement phases 622 
of the PIROP process, their commitment to PIROP will be determined by Pacific Rim nations‘ 623 
willingness to act as partners and to cooperate with PICs in the implementation process‖ [31](p. 731). 624 
Eventual multilateral, international legal agreements on Pacific fisheries and seabed mining should 625 
not be seen as inevitable, if somewhat distant from realization. Pacific nations may start seeing merit in 626 
emphasizing bilateral relations if multilateral fishing agreements continue to be violated or they have a 627 
limited say in decision making processes concerning seabed mining. The FSM is currently in discussion 628 
with the PRC concerning exclusive rights to fish in its EEZ, which gives the PRC a stake in also policing 629 
illegal fishing within a zone of exclusiveness that the host nation lacks the resources to police and 630 
monitor itself. Tonga‘s and Nauru‘s alliance with the commercial mining company, Nautilus, to secure 631 
a stake in the resource extraction and in the ISA organizational process has been noted [87]. 632 
Faced with the possibility of a profusion of fragmented and uncoordinated arrangements with 633 
various commercial operators and external nation states, Pacific island nations need to develop 634 
common policies that view the range of Pacific marine resources as an integrated and interrelated 635 
whole. Fisheries legislation and institutions are far ahead of those for seabed minerals in this regard. 636 
Variable levels of research and legislation on different marine resources open the risk of a variety of 637 
narrowly focused marine policies inadvertently counteracting each other. Seabed mining will most 638 
likely first proceed within Pacific nation EEZs, allowing greater Pacific island control of the process. 639 
This also means that Pacific island pelagic, benthic and neritic environments will bear the brunt of any 640 
negative consequences of seabed mining. Wilkinson and Salvat recently made a strong case that 641 
phenomenon associated with the tragedy of the commons had now extended to populated coastal areas 642 
of the Pacific and elsewhere, adding an extra moral dimension to an environmental problem [97].  643 
They argue that the solution to the declining circumstances of those now suffering from this 644 
phenomenon lies in humanity as a whole making moral choices about lifestyle decisions, such as 645 
population policy and material lifestyles [97]. 646 
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There are, therefore, very real limits to the empowerment of Pacific island states in managing 647 
Pacific Ocean maritime resources. The destinies of both Pacific island MIRAB economies and 648 
resource rent economies in this era of heightened, human-induced climate change are now even further 649 
linked to processes beyond its area over which they have no influence. The low lying atolls of the 650 
Pacific are particularly prone to sea level rise and increased typhoon activity and intensity associated 651 
with global warming [98]. Now, more aware of influences looming just over the horizon, the region‘s 652 
inhabitants must, nevertheless, still generally modify the impact of these external forces rather than 653 
hope to shape them. However, Pacific island nations can exercise much greater control than they do at 654 
present through utilizing working and enduring models of local management and working collaboratively 655 
with each other, with marine scientists and commercial entities to anticipate future trends in marine 656 
resource use further offshore. 657 
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